Martin Stokhof
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Martin Stokhof is emeritus professor of philosophy at the University of Amsterdam and Jin Yuelin professor of logic at Tsinghua University, Beijing.
He studied philosophy and linguistics at the University of Amsterdam and received his PhD there in 1984.
He has published on topics in formal semantics and philosophy of language, and on the philosophy of Wittgenstein. He is co-author of a two-volume textbook in logic and formal semantics and wrote a textbook on philosophy of language.
He has extensive experience in science administration, in both national (KNAW, NWO) and international (ESF, ERC) scientific organisations.
Stokhof is member of the Dutch Royal Academy of Sciences (2006), Institut International de Philosophie (2007), Academia Europea (2016).
He joins the Paris IAS in March 2025 for a one-month writing residency.
Research Interests
Philosophy of language; history of analytic philosophy, in particular Wittgenstein; formal semantics.
Travelling Concepts and Conceptual Engineering
Many concepts are 'travelling concepts': they are used in both everyday as well as specialised contexts (education, science, law, politics, …). This applies to core cognitive concepts (meaning, understanding, knowledge, truth, justification), but also to normative concepts (agency, free will, responsibility). In different contexts the application criteria of such concepts change in often subtle but nevertheless crucial ways.
The basic idea of conceptual engineering is that traditional conceptual analysis should not be the only concern of philosophy. Analysis can, and should be, complemented with the task of ‘engineering’ better concepts.
From the travelling concepts perspective the normativity that is central to conceptual engineering is problematic, as is the feasibility of actually implementing engineered conceptual change.
Current discussions about generative AI are broad and, often, confused. The confusions provide exciting material to study, first of all, some of the mechanisms involved in travelling concepts, and, second, the (often hidden) normative stances that are taken in the debates. We will take as our core example the concept of understanding. Starting from the analysis developed by Wittgenstein we will address three questions. First, how do generative AI systems fare with respect to that concept of understanding? Second, what changes in the concept might be brought about by the rapid acceptance of generative AI systems? Third, can a conceptual engineering approach help to increase the awareness of the general public, scientists and policy makers of the complex interactions between generative AI and our everyday concepts?
Key publications
"Formal semantics and Wittgenstein: an alternative?", The Monist, 96(2), 2013, 205-231
World and Life as One. Ethics and Ontology in Wittgenstein’s Early Work, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 2002
"Dynamic predicate logic" [with Jeroen Groenendijk] In: Linguistics and Philosophy, Vol. 14, no. 1, 1991, pp. 39-100"
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