Agency and responsibility. A novel approach between philosophy and cognitive science

Intentional agency and its relationship with individual responsibility is among the most thriving areas of interaction between moral psychology and the philosophy and cognitive science of action. However, providing a coherent, unified account of how intentional agency unfolds in the natural world has proven difficult. In particular, a substantial controversial point concerns the contribution of conscious mental states to action production. Empirical findings in the cognitive science of volitional processes have been often regarded as straightforwardly supporting scepticism about full-fledged intentional behaviour. Correspondingly, the scope and meaning of the notion of responsibility, and the reliability of the subjective experience of agency have been challenged. By contrast, this project takes a novel, constructive, stance regarding how insights from philosophy and cognitive science jointly foster understanding of intentional agency. In taking up this challenge, the project examines the prospects for theory of agency in the light of novel empirical research on the psychology and cognitive science of volition and action control. In particular, the project aims to address the following research questions: (1) How can we offer a coherent, scientifically plausible, account of our ability to act intentionally, exhibiting control over our behaviour? (2) Does intentional and responsible agency require an active causal role of conscious mental states, and a transparent access to the motivational sources of behaviour? (3) To what extent do the philosophy and science of agency respectively help to settle the dispute about borderline cases of intentional or voluntary actions?