‘Fast-track negotiation’: a negotiation model for conflicts of the 21st century

Millennial in origin, peace negotiation is at present the lifeblood of conflict resolution. There would be far less peace in the world without it. Yet, in the 21st century, negotiation is stumbling badly on account of two interrelated but fixable problems: 1) practice is dominated by a single model of what is considered effective and legitimate negotiation; and 2) the dominant model’s underlying tenets, in aggregate, produce a form of negotiation that is too slow.

Let’s call the dominant model: ‘Model A’. What are its tenets of effective and legitimate negotiation? We can name many of them: 1) comprehensive agendas; 2) broad participation; 3) empathy building between adversaries; 4) Track 1 default; 5) in-person procedures;6) international involvement; 7) non-directive mediator and guarantor roles; 8) minor roles for legal and technical teams; 9) aversion to ‘zero drafts’; 10) formal rules like “nothing is agreed until everything is agreed”; and 11) lengthy final texts. On top of these, Model A has an additional layer of unstated assumptions: 1) mutually hurting stalemates are necessary; 2) an orderly process is possible; 3) negotiation has a moderating effect on the parties and a holding effect on the conflict; 4) negotiation can bring about a decisive and irreversible transition; and 5) time is on our side.

As a set of interlocking ideals, these and other premises of Model A are admirable. The problem – so often ventilated within conflict-affected societies – is that the underlying conditions very rarely match, thus producing a long list of negative consequences for peace: 1) missed opportunities to reduce or reshape the conflict before it entrenches for the long term; 2) suffering populations waiting longer for any basic relief; 3) diminished local agency in the solutions; and 4) under-consideration of alternative pathways. These and other consequences are avoidable. What is missing is a well-organised and legitimate Model B: a ‘fast-track’ model.

My Paris IAS paper will aim to articulate some of the key ideas and arguments of the fast-track model and, in so doing, introduce an innovative model of peace negotiation that 1) expands the current one-model toolbox of what is seen as legitimate and effective negotiation in the global system; and 2) increases the possibility of speed, localisation and results in negotiation efforts.

Indicative premises of the fast-track model include: 1) tighter negotiation agendas; 2) ‘inclusive enough’ participation; 3) acceptance of transactional logics; 4) a multi-Track default; 5) greater use of technology and data tools; 6) clear local leadership; 7) more directive (and localised) mediator and guarantor roles; 8) more empowered legal and technical teams; 9) incorporation of ‘zero drafts’; 10) rules allowing for implementation on the go; and 11) a preference for framework deals. These premises would correlate to a number of new assumptions like: 1) there is no perfect moment to get talks started; 2) the process will be hard to control and contain; 3) negotiation will breed new conflict risks and spoilers; 4) outcomes will be partial and incremental; and 5) faster results are desirable and feasible.

Key publications

Negotiating Transitional Justice (Cambridge Univ. Press, 2020);

Necessary Evils: Amnesties and the Search for Justice (Cambridge Univ. Press, 2010);

Truth Commissions and Procedural Fairness (Cambridge Univ. Press, 2006).